

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 NEA-10 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-03 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12 ACDA-19 RSR-01 /171 W

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 2533

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, UR

SUBJ: PEACEKEEPING WORKING GROUP

REF: USUN 2457

1. AFTER UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORT FIND QUALIFYING LANGUAGE FOR "SUBSEQUENT ALTERNATIONS" ITEM IN BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS BEFORE WG MEETING, US AGREED TO PUT ITEM IN "AGREED IN PRINCIPLE" COLUMN OF DIRECT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SC IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

2. AFTER UNDERSCORING US DESIRE FIND AGREEMENT ON PEACE-KEEPING AMB. SCHAUFLE ONCE AGAIN EXPRESSED US RESERVATIONS ABOUT PIECEMEAL NATURE OF EXERCISE. REMINDED WG THAT THERE UNANIMOUS ACCORD AMONG MEMBERS THAT AGREEMENT ON LIST WAS SUBJECT TO SUBSEQUENT FULL PEACEKEEPING AGREEMENT AND THAT SC IN ESTABLISHING ANY SPECIFIC PEACEKEEPING OPERATION HAD AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT OR REJECT GUIDELINES WHICH WG AND COMMITTEE OF 33 MIGHT AGREE UPON. ALSO RECALLED SOVIET STATEMENT IT NOT EXPECTED THAT, IN NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS, SC WOULD ACTUALLY MAKE MANY DECISIONS ON SUBSEQUENT ALTERNATIONS. WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT US POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED ON HOW "SUBSEQUENT ALTERNATIONS" WOULD BE MADE AND THAT US AGREEMENT CONDITIONED ON FINAL AGREEMENT ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL UN BODIES, US AGREED TO INCLU-  
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SION "SUBSEQUENT ALTERNATIONS" AS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE.

3. SOVIET REP OVINNIKOV STATED FINAL AGREEMENT ON SUBSEQUENT ALTERNATIONS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE AFTER WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON DETAILED FORMULATIONS ON SUBSTANCE, INCLUDING SUBSEQUENT ALTERNATIONS. BRAZIL AND UK RAISED SAME RESERVATIONS AS US BUT AGREED ACCEPT ITEM. BRAZIL SAID WORDING COULD BE INTERPRETED COVER ALL SUBSEQUENT ALTERATIONS WHICH IT COULD NOT ACCEPT. UK REP STATED ITS AGREEMENT DOES NOT IMPLY THAT SC WOULD DISCUSS OR DECIDE ON ALTERATIONS. ADDED HE ATTRACTED TO CANADIAN PROPOSAL BY WHICH AGREED SUBSEQUENT ALTERATIONS OF ITEMS 1-5 WOULD PROPERLY BE RESPONSIBILITY OF SC BUT OTHERS WOULD BE SUBJECT ONLY TO ITS SUPERVISION.

4. WITH GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT WG SHOULD NOW MAKE INTERIM REPORT TO COMITE OF 33 SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT REPORT SHOULD STATE (1) THAT WG DEALING WITH PEACEKEEPING IN GENERAL, NOT JUST OBSERVERS; (2) WG WOULD RESUME DISCUSSION LATER ON NON-AGREED ITEMS; (3) BUT WG WOULD FIRST GO ON TO SIMILAR LISTS FOR ART. 29 COMMITTEE, MSC, SYG AND, POSSIBLY, COMMANDER IN THAT ORDER.

5. UK OBJECTED THAT WG MANDATE DID NOT GO BEYOND OBSERVER MISSIONS AND STATED THAT CONSIDERATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER ORGANS AS PROPOSED BY USSR WOULD PREJUDGE FINAL DECISIONS OF WG ON MANY KEY QUESTIONS WHICH REMAIN TO BE SETTLED. USSR THEN STATED THAT SC WOULD DECIDE IN EACH CASE WHETHER ART. 29 OR MSC WOULD BE USED IN PKO. MEETING ENDED WITH AGREEMENT THAT SECRETARIAT WOULD PREPARE WG REPORT TO COMMITTEE FOR NEXT WG MEETING JULY 18.

6. COMMENT: IF SOVIETS STICK TO THEIR POSITION REGARDING PREPARATION OF WG REPORT TO COMITE, WE ANTICIPATE PROTRACTED DEBATE. IN SUBSEQUENT TALKS WITH UK, JAPAN, CANADA AND BRAZIL WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT PROCEDURE SUGGESTED BY SOVIETS WOULD DEFINE RESPONSIBILITIES OF SYG LAST-AND PROBABLY LEAST. WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT SINCE ART. 29 COMMITTEE AND MSC ARE EMANATIONS OF SC AND WOULD PERFORM, IN NEARLY ALL PROPOSALS, FUNCTION OF BRIDGE BETWEEN SC AND CONFIDENTIAL

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SYG IT MORE LOGICAL TO PROCEED WITH LATTER'S RESPONSIBILITIES NEXT.

7. THERE SEEMS TO BE RECEPTIVITY TO OUR WARNINGS ALTHOUGH CANADIANS, WHO REPRESENTED BY NEW MAN, MORE RETICENT THAN OTHERS.  
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